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PRIVATE PAPERS NOW SUBJECT TO REASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-ANDRESEN V. MARYLAND
Since 1967, federal courts have been in conflict over the question
whether a defendant's private papers are, by their very nature, within
the scope of the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment.' A recent
Supreme Court decision purportedly answers this question.2 In
Andresen v. Maryland,3 the Court held that the seizure of a person's
business records, pursuant to a valid search warrant, and their subse-
quent introduction at trial did not violate the Fifth Amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination.' The Court deemed the privilege inap-
plicable because testimony is not compelled in the case of a seizure of
papers pursuant to a valid search warrant. By indicating that this was
the constitutionally significant distinction between this case and earlier
Supreme Court cases involving subpoenas of "private papers,"'5 the
Court apparently decided that all items of evidence, whatever their
nature, may be seized pursuant to a valid search warrant.
Andresen, an attorney specializing in real estate settlements, came
under scrutiny during an investigation of real estate settlement activi-
ties in the Washington, D.C., area.' Search warrants were obtained
1. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967), the question was stated to be:
"whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being
the object of a reasonable search and seizure." Although the question seems to imply
primarily a Fourth Amendment problem, it has been applied in the Fifth Amendment
context. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471 (1976); Schaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d
175 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1977); VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d
364 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972); Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). The
problem posed in Warden is actually a product of the interplay between the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. See note 21 infra. What Warden asked is whether there is any item
which the Fifth Amendment would forbid from being introduced at trial against its owner;
if there is, then a seizure of the item would be unreasonable.
2. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Although the Court specifically alluded
to Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and the question reserved therein, the decision
may only be applicable to the business records which were involved in the factual situation
before it. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441 n.3 (1976).
3. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The privilege is contained in the words: "[n]o person . ..
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
5. 427 U.S. at 473-74. The Court cited Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), and
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), as providing the basis for this distinction.
6. An examination by the investigators indicated that Andresen, acting as settlement
attorney in a purchase of Lot 13T in the Potomac Woods subdivision of Montgomery
County, had defrauded the purchaser into believing that 13T was free of liens when in
fact it was not. 427 U.S. at 465.
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permitting a search of Andresen's law office and the office of the Mt.
Vernon Development Corporation. Many of Andresen's business papers
and records were seized.' Several' were subsequently introduced into
evidence at trial over his Fourth and Fifth Amendment objections that
the items seized were the fruits of an unreasonable search and that their
introduction into evidence compelled him to testify against himself.
Andresen was convicted for false pretenses and fraudulent misappro-
priation by a fiduciary, 0 and he later appealed. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's decision, rejecting Andre-
sen's Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims." The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and, in a 7-2 decision, 3 affirmed the lower court."
This Note will analyze the Court's treatment of the claim involving
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 5 The focus
will be on the Court's failure to discuss adequately the nature of the
seized business records, and the impact of this decision on the zone of
7. The offices of the Mount Vernon Development Corporation were searched because
Andresen was its incorporator, sole shareholder, resident agent, and director. 427 U.S. at
466.
8. Although the Court accepted the estimate that the seizure amounted to between 2%
and 3% of the files in Andresen's law office and less than 5% of the corporation's files,
427 U.S. at 466-67, the percentages did not indicate the immensity of the seizures. In
Petitioner's Brief at 5, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), it was noted that
literally thousands of petitioner's private papers, documents, and handwritten notes were
seized.
9. After suppression and return of some' of the papers, three documents from the
"Potomac Woods General" file of the Mount Vernon Development Corporation were ad-
mitted into evidence and five items seized from Andresen's law office were admitted into
evidence. 427 U.S. at 468.
10. Prior to the issuance of the search warrants, three groups of homeowners had com-
plained that Andresen had misappropriated money which they had given him "to procure
titles to their properties free and clear of all encumbrances." 427 U.S. at 466 n.1.
11. 24 Md. App. 128, 331 A.2d 78 (1975). Four of the false pretenses counts were re-
versed because the indictment had failed to allege intent to defraud.
12. 423 U.S. 822 (1975).
13. Justice Blackmun presented the opinion of the Court. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall dissented. 427 U.S. at 484 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Id. at 493 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
14. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
15. The Court also was faced with a Fourth Amendment issue in this case concerning
the validity of the search warrant used to seize the business records and papers. The issue
arose over whether the language of the warrant was too "general" to be constitutionally
permissible. After a lengthy listing of all items to be seized, each warrant contained the
phrase "together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time]
unknown." 427 U.S. at 479. The Court held that when this phrase was properly read with
reference to the whole sentence, it did not constitute language which would be too
"general" so as to render the subsequent search and seizure "constitutionally unreasona-
ble." Id. at 480-81.
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privacy concept, which had been considered a "fundamental value" of
the privilege."6
BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is con-
tained in the provision that [n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." It was originally aimed
at preventing the use of torture to force incriminating testimony from
the lips of the accused. 7 Through the years, however, the privilege has
been interpreted liberally'" and it has been held to include protection
against the compelled production of private papers."
16. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), the Court stated:
[The privilege against self-incrimination reflects many of our fundamental
values and most noble aspirations ...[including] our respect for the inviola-
bility of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life.'"
17. 427 U.S. at 470. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had its
historical roots in the general abhorrence for the practices of the Star Chamber and the
ecclesiastical courts. Various methods of torture, including application of the rack, were
used to force incriminating testimony from the lips of the accused. The accused became
his own prosecutor, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination repre-
sented an attempt to protect against such compulsion. See generally, L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 1-20 (1955).
18. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52(1964), Justice Goldberg listed the
following as being the concerns of the Fifth Amendment:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury, or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair
play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government
to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and
by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load [citation omitted]; our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life" [citation omitted]; our distrust of self-deprecatory
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter
to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent." [citation omitted]
Id. at 55. See also J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961), where 12 separate
arguments are listed in support of the privilege.
The multitude of interests protected by the privilege is in keeping with the repeated
remark that the Fifth Amendment should be interpreted liberally. In Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1897), for example, it was stated that the privilege "is as broad
as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." Id. at 562. See Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967
SuP. CT. REV. 193, 193-96 (1967).
19. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
[Vol. 26:848
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The first case recognizing the Fifth Amendment's protection of pri-
vate papers was the landmark decision of Boyd v. United States in
1886.20 In Boyd, the Court held that a court order for the production of
petitioner's "private" paper and its subsequent introduction into evi-
dence violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.2 The Court
stated that the essence of the violation was the invasion into the individ-
ual's zone of privacy.22 Seeing no constitutionally significant distinction
322, 335-36 (1973); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 595 (1945) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911); Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). See
also Hudak, The "Mere Evidence" Rule: Need for Re-evaluation, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
361, 377 (1971); Note, The Fifth Amendment and the Protection of Records: Are Owner-
ship and Possession Always Necessary?, 9 GA. L. REv. 658, 659 (1975); Note, 42 FORDHAM
L. REV. 202 (1973). Contra, Comment, The Protection of Privacy by the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: A Doctrine Laid to Rest?, 59 IowA L. REv. 1336, 1343 (1974).
20. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, petitioner had contracted with the government to
provide certain foreign plate glass for a government building which was being constructed.
Part of the agreement was that if petitioner filled the order out of his then existing duty-
paid stock of foreign plate glass, the government would allow the petitioner to replace
what was used with duty-free glass. The plate glass provided came from petitioner's duty-
paid stock and was replaced. Afterwards, however, petitioner imported 35 cases more of
plate glass and claimed that it should be duty-free. The invoice sought to be introduced
by the government was the one for the original replacement.
21. 116 U.S. at 634-35. In Boyd, this mutual concern of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments is called "the intimate relationship." The Court pointed out:
They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and sei-
zures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the
purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal
cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search
and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 633. The problem posed by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), is actually a
product of this interplay. See note 1 supra. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
349 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting), where Justice Marshall noted that both amendments
involve "aspects of a person's right to develop for himself a sphere of personal privacy."
Id. at 349; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582 (1946); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-95 (1914). But see Comment, The
Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dimensions of an "Intimate Relationship," 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 857 (1966).
22. 116 U.S. at 630, where the Court stated:
They [the principles behind the Fourth and Fifth Amendments] apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property, where that right has never been forfeited.
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between the invasion which occurred when one's papers were seized and
when one's testimony was compelled,23 the Court reasoned that the Fifth
Amendment privilege extended to private papers.24
The scope of the protection accorded private papers by the Fifth
Amendment was delineated in cases following Boyd. Courts held that
papers would be protected from production in response to a subpoena if
the papers were compulsorily seized,25 personal," incriminating,n testi-
monial in nature," and in the possession of the one claiming the protec-
The idea that the privilege protects privacy had its roots in the Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), decision in which it was said that the "essence of the offence . . .
is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property." Id. at 630. Since that time, courts have been constant in their recogni-
tion of this interest. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Court
recognized a "right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life" [citation omitted] Id. at 55. In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the
Court recognized a "private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought .... " Id.
at 327. In Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974), the Court noted that the interest
in privacy is interrelated with the Fifth Amendment. See also Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-61 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965); McKay, supra note 18. But see Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The
Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968).
23. 116 U.S. at 633. The Court stated that "we have been unable to perceive that the
seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substan-
tially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself."
24. Although the privilege is generally viewed as being applicable to private papers,
records, or books because of the requirement that the item seized be both testimonial and
communicative in nature, it has been noted, at least on one occasion, that the privilege
may extend to other items of evidence. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966), the Court noted that "[slome tests seemingly directed to obtain 'physical evi-
dence,' for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function during interro-
gation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial."
25. See note 17 supra.
26. A number of cases have held that the papers and records of independent entities,
i.e., labor unions, partnerships, corporations, committees, are not the personal or private
papers of their representatives. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), in which
it was held that the Fifth Amendment privilege "applies to the business records of the
sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents containing more
intimate information about the individual's private life," id. at 87-88, but that it did not
apply to partnership records held by an individual partner. See also Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (records of a labor union not protected); Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (records of the Communist Party of Denver not protected);
United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950) (records of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Committee not protected); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (records of
labor union not protected); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (corporate records
not protected).
27. See McKay, supra note 18.
28. Limitations have been placed on the items of evidence to which the Fifth Amend-
[Vol. 26:848
ANDRESEN v. MARYLAND
tion. 5 If the papers did not fulfill all of these requirements, they would
not be protected. If, however, they did fulfill all of these requirements,
they would be protected from production by the Fifth Amendment. 0
THE DECISION
In Andresen v. Maryland, the Court established a different standard
for determining whether private papers are protected.3 Noting that the
Fifth Amendment protected against the introduction of compelled testi-
ment applies. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 487 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Courts have recognized a difference between testimonial evidence or evidence used in a
testimonial manner and real evidence. Thus, even though evidence may be compelled or
may be incriminating, if the evidence does not involve oral communications or written
matter used in a testimonial manner, it may be introduced at trial against the individual
who provided the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice
samples permitted); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplars
permitted); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup identifications permitted);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (evidentiary use of blood samples permitted).
29. The Supreme Court in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) stated: "[wie
do indeed attach constitutional importance to possession, but only because of its close
relationship to those personal compulsions and intrusions which the Fifth . . . forbids."
Id. at 336 n.20. See also Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 459 (1913); Note, The
Fifth Amendment and the Protection of Records: Are Ownership and Possession Always
Necessary?, 9 GA. L. REv. 658, 659-60 (1975). However, the Court in Couch did note that
there may be "constructive possession" situations in which divestiture of possession is so
fleeting that the Fifth Amendment privilege may still apply. 409 U.S. at 333. See also id.
at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976); Com-
ment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Considerations, 6 LOYOLA (L.A.) L. REv. 274 (1973).
30. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Justice Brennan stated that:
[Tihe Fifth Amendment protects an individual citizen against the compelled
production of testimonial matter that might tend to incriminate him, provided
it is a matter that comes within the zone of privacy recognized by the Amend-
ment to secure to the individual "a private inner sanctum" of individual feeling
and thought.
Id. at 485 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Quoted portion of passage is from
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
31. The Supreme Court's shift in its analysis of the Fifth Amendment privilege actually
began with Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), which was decided earlier in
the year. In Fisher, the Court held that an accountant's workpapers concerning a tax-
payer's tax liability, could be obtained from the taxpayer pursuant to an IRS summons
without violating the taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege. Although noting that the
papers were not the taxpayer's "private papers," which was enough to resolve the case,
the Court went on to state that absent any physical compulsion of the taxpayer, no Fifth
Amendment privilege issue was present. Id. at 405-14. By shifting its focus from the non-
private nature of the documents seized to the physical acts which accompanied the pro-
duction of the documents, the Court, in effect, laid the foundation for the Andresen
decision.
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mony, the Court held that private papers would be protected if their
production was "compelled" in a very narrow sense of the word. What
was required was some act which either explicitly or implicitly com-
pelled an individual to make or produce an incriminating communica-
tion. Without it, the Fifth Amendment would not protect against the
production of private papers. This, the Court stated, was the lesson of
history32 and of case law,3 , including cases involving the production of
an accused's papers.34
The Court distinguished earlier cases involving subpoenas from cases
involving searches and seizures. The Court stated that in the former
cases an implied act of compelled testimony could make the privilege
applicable. 5 By responding to the subpoena, an individual implicitly
authenticates the documents. The production is tantamount to a state-
ment that the records are in fact those which are requested. Since a
failure to satisfactorily respond to the subpoena would be subject to
contempt, the Court stated that such a situation might amount to com-
pelled testimony for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 7 The Court
32. 427 U.S. at 470.
33. See 427 U.S. at 477.
34. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921), the Court stated:
[t]here is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of
property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall
within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be
seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit and warrant.
This, the Andresen Court stated, was supported by Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927), and by Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). 427 U.S. at 474. In Marron,
the Court held that the introduction of an accused's business ledger at trial did not violate
his Fifth Amendment rights. In Abet, the Court held that the introduction of the accused's
false identity papers and certain written evidence of espionage did not violate his Fifth
Amendment rights. In both cases, the evidence was secured through no help of the accused
and the searches were conducted pursuant to valid warrants.
35. 427 U.S. at 473-74.
36. Id. Support for this proposition comes from dicta in a number of the Court's prior
decisions. For example, in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976), the Court
noted that "[clompliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers
demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer." See also Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974), quoting from United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698
(1944); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330, 346-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2264, at 380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
37. 427 U.S. at 473-74. The uncertainty of this argument is underscored by the Court's
recent half-hearted support for it. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976),
the Court stated:
[tihe elements of compulsion are clearly present [in a subpoena situation],
but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are
both "testimonial" and "incriminating" for purposes of applying the Fifth
Amendment. These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical
[Vol. 26:848
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saw a difference, however, in the case of a search and seizure. Provided
that the search and seizure are legal,38 there are no constitutional prob-
lems when one's documents are seized39 and introduced into evidence.
The government discovers, produces, and authenticates the documents
on its own.40 The defendant is not forced to say or to do anything which
might amount to compelled testimony; he merely stands by while the
production of his documents is "independently secured through skillful
investigation."'"
Recognizing this distinction between subpoena and search and seizure
cases, the Andresen Court set forth certain guidelines for determining
whether a defendant's private documents may be seized and introduced
into evidence against him at trial. The presence of any one of three
factors in a factual situation would be enough to prevent introduction
of the seized items at trial. One factor to be considered by the court is
whether the search was illegal.42 If illegal, then the very illegality of the
search would make the evidence "compelled," and the introduction into
evidence of inculpatory items would constitute a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.43 A second factor to consider is whether the communica-
tion in the private documents was made under coercion. If the individ-
ual was forced to commit his thoughts to writing, then the type of
compelled testimony which is explicitly protected against by the privi-
lege against self-incrimination would be present.44 The third factor is
answers; their resolution may instead depend on the facts and circumstances of
particular cases or classes thereof.
See also id. at 414.
38. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) for a discussion of the require-
ments of a valid search. In general, warrantless searches are "per se" unreasonable, except
in certain narrowly defined circumstances.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated. ... The Andresen Court noted that it was the presence of a Fourth Amend-
ment violation in earlier Supreme Court cases which was the "legal predicate" for the
Fifth Amendment violation (also known as the "convergence theory"). 427 U.S. at 472 n.6
(1976). See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906). Reasoning that absent a Fourth Amendment violation, there would be no Fifth
Amendment violation, the Court stated that a Fourth Amendment violation constituted
compulsion for Fifth Amendment purposes. See generally Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217 (1960) and Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) in which no Fifth Amendment
violation was present in situations where items had been seized pursuant to lawful
searches.
40. 427 U.S. at 474.
41. Id. at 477, quoting from Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
42. See note 38 supra.
43. 427 U.S.at 472.
44. 427 U.S. at 475. In support of its reasoning the Court analogizes the situation of a
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whether the defendant was forced to authenticate the seized items at
trial.4 5 If he was, then his statements might constitute compelled testi-
mony which is forbidden by the privilege." Absent one of these factors,
there could be no grounds for an assertion of the self-incrimination
privilege."
The Andresen Court found none of the factors to be present in the
factual situation before it. The investigative unit had proceeded under
authority of a valid search warrant which had been issued by an impar-
tial magistrate." The records were in existence prior to the search and
the petitioner was not forced to commit his thoughts to the records when
they were made. Further, at trial the state authenticated the records by
means of a handwriting expert. At no time during the search and seizure
or introduction of the seized items at trial was the petitioner forced to
say or do anything. In the absence of any of one of the aforementioned
factors, the Andresen Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
was inapplicable to the seized business records."
CRITICISM BASED UPON PRIOR CASE LAW
In establishing its standard, the Andresen Court failed to discuss
adequately the nature of the item seized. The Court chose to take a
narrow look at only one of the requirements, compulsion, which are
necessary before the Fifth Amendment will protect against the produc-
tion of private papers." With its special definition of compelled testi-
mony, the Court apparently is signalling a return to the historic roots
of the privilege. The message of Andresen is that the Fifth Amendment
privilege only protects against compelled, implicit or explicit, oral or
seizure of forced writing to the seizure of compelled "oral communications." If an individ-
ual is forced to communicate his thoughts to another, he is compelled for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. If, however, he freely communicates with another, his conversations
may be seized and introduced at trial against him. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966), in which the accused voluntarily communicated with a government informant
concerning a jury tampering scheme. In like manner, if one is forced to commit his
thoughts to writing, he is being "compelled" to communicate.
45. Although specifically referring to a subpoena situation, one may also be forced to
authenticate within the same sense if during a legal search he is asked to produce or
discover certain documents. By producing and discovering in response to a search warrant,
one certainly communicates as much as if he were responding to a subpoena.
46. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
47. See 427 U.S. at 473, 477.
48. See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971), for the
importance of the fact that the warrant be issued by an impartial and detached magis-
trate.
49. 427 U.S. at 476-77.
50. See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
[Vol. 26:848
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written testimony. It does not protect against the production of
"private" papers, unless either their creation or production is com-
pelled." In dismissing Boyd v. United States2 as the creation of the
since-rejected "mere evidence" rule,53 the Court refused to countenance
any privacy interest in papers beyond the wording of the privilege.
The Andresen decision rests upon a very narrow distinction which has
been criticized by courts and commentators alike.54 The Court stated
that the Fifth Amendment protects against a subpoena of private papers
because of the presence of some implicit compelled testimony, while it
does not protect against the seizure of private papers pursuant to search
warrant because the compelled testimony is lacking. This distinction
misapprehends the real interest which courts have stated as being pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment.
The heart of the Fifth Amendment privilege is that it protects against
the introducton of the testimony of an accused if it is seized against his
will."5 Whether an accused is "physically forced" to say or do anything
51. As the Court noted in Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913): "A party
is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production." See also Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973), which stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination "adheres basically to the person, not to information that may
incriminate him."
52. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
53. 427 U.S. at 472 n.6. The "mere evidence" rule was stated in Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920), a case decided 34 years after the Boyd decision. The essence
of the rule was that search warrants could not be issued for mere exploratory searches
through an individual's house or effects. Warrants could only issue if the government or
some complaining party had a property interest in the items desired to be seized. Without
such a property interest, a "reasonable" search could not be made. The "mere evidence"
rule was rejected by the court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
54. See 427 U.S. at 486 (1976), in which Justice Brennan stated:
A privilege protecting against the compelled production of testimonial material
is a hollow guarantee where production of that material may be secured through
the expedient of search and seizure.
See also Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S 991 (1971), in which
the court stated: "[the] distinction between obtaining papers from a defendant by search
and seizure rather than by force of process is more shadow than substance." Id. at 149;
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL §665 n.88 (1969), which stated:
It is much less clear that such a distinction [between the compulsion produced
by a subpoena and that produced by a search warrant] would be sound, or fully
consistent with the interests protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination.
See generally Lipton, Search Warrant in Tax Fraud Investigations, 56 A.B.A.J. 941 (1970).
55. That this is the meaning of the compulsion which is prohibited by the Fifth Amend-
ment was made clear in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), where it was stated:
In practice the result is the same to one accused of crime, whether he be obliged
to supply evidence against himself or whether such evidence be obtained by an
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either before or during a seizure of this testimony may have nothing
whatsoever to do with whether the testimony is taken against his will.
Compulsion to do or to say something may be present even without a
show of "physical force.""6 There is no "physical force" in the case of a
subpoena for the production of one's papers. An order is issued and
service made. Yet, lurking behind the service is the implied threat that
failure to comply will be treated as contempt. 7 Likewise, there is no
physical force in the case of a search warrant for the seizure of an
accused's papers. The Andresen Court was correct in stating that the
accused is not forced to aid in the discovery, production, or authentica-
tion of the documents. Yet, once again, lurking in the background is the
threat that if the accused does not comply, he will be forced to do so. A
refusal to allow entry would result in the law enforcement officers' em-
ploying various self-help methods which in another context would be
labelled "breaking and entering.""8 The Fifth Amendment protects
against this sort of implied compulsion as well as the implied threat of
contempt that is present in a subpoena order.
Furthermore, the subpoena cases prior to Andresen did not turn upon
the Court's suggested narrow reading of the "compulsion" requirement
of the Fifth Amendment. In these cases, the reason the Fifth Amend-
ment was held to be applicable or inapplicable was the presence or
absence of a privacy interest. Contrary to the Court's understanding,
illegal search of his premises and seizure of his private papers. In either case he
is the unwilling source of the evidence, and the Fifth Amendment forbids that
he shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.
Papers seized pursuant to a valid search warrant are as much seized against an accused's
will as are papers seized pursuant to an illegal search. In both cases, the accused has no
opportunity to refuse seizure. Id. at 306. See Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 149 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1932);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
56. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which blood was extracted
from the defendant's body. Although the defendant was not "forced" to say or do anything
during the extraction, the Court still found compulsion present. See also Gilbert v. Califor-
nia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplars taken from the defendant held to be
"compelled").
57. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
58. See D.C. CODE ENCYL. §23-301, 18 U.S.C. §3109 (1970). See also VonderAhe v.
Howland, 508 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1975), in which Circuit Judge Ely pointed out this fact:
One need ask only what would happen if the addressee of a warrant refused to
allow the search to be conducted to appreciate the magnitude of compulsion
produced by a search warrant. Without the slightest hesitation his doors would
be broken down, he would be placed under arrest, and the desired material
would be seized. How the imminence of such force can be considered as anything
other than compulsion escapes us.
Id. at 373 (Ely, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Boyd v. United States, was not concerned primarily with the "mere
evidence" rule." The Boyd case was concerned mainly with privacy. 0
Its holding"2 was based upon the belief that the Fifth Amendment was
framed with the protection of privacy in mind.2 The constitutional of-
fense occurred in Boyd because the accused's private realm of thought
and feeling had been invaded when the private papers were requested,
not because the request was for "mere evidence." The petitioner was
being asked to create the government's case by providing his own pri-
vate testimonial paper. Boyd stated that this was constitutionally im-
permissible because the order to produce private papers forced the ac-
cused to be a witness against himself. 3
The Andresen Court's reading of cases following Boyd is similarly
defective. Because they did not deal with private papers, those cases do
not detract from the concern for the private nature of the papers at
issue. For example, in Wilson v. United States,64 the Court held that a
representative of a corporation may not assert his Fifth Amendment
privilege against the subpoena of corporate records that are in his cus-
tody. Corporate records, although possibly incriminating, are not the
representative's private records. They are the records of the corporate
entity which he represents and are essentially public in nature." The
Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to them because of their
public nature. 6
59. Although the "mere evidence" rule is traditionally viewed as a rule of evidence
concerned with property interests, it is to be noted that the reason it was overruled in
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967), was that privacy was no more dis-
turbed by a seizure of "mere evidence" than it was by a seizure of the instrumentalities
of a crime. The "mere evidence" rule represented an unsuccessful attempt at protecting
privacy interests. Comment, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: A
Constitutional Analysis, 69 Nw. U. L. Rav. 626, 633 (1974). An interpretation along these
lines would appear to be more consistent with the reasoning of Boyd v. United States, and
the specific question that was reserved in Warden.
60. Id. at 630.
61. 116 U.S. at 634-35.
62. See note 22 supra.
63. 116 U.S. at 633.
64. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
65. Records also are public in nature if they are so-called "required records." Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). If one is required to maintain records by authority of
law, he may not raise his Fifth Amendment privilege to defeat an order for their produc-
tion. This is because the Fifth Amendment was meant to protect the individual from
governmental compulsion which forces an individual to "divulge information in which the
government's only legitimate interest arises from the incriminating nature of the informa-
tion." Note, The Fifth Amendment and the Protection of Records: Are Ownership and
Possession Always Necessary?, 9 GA. L. REv. 658, 661 (1975).
66. If, however, the records were those of the representative kept in a purely personal
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Similarly, in Couch v. United States,"7 the Court held that a subpoena
requiring the production of the defendant's papers by her accountant
did not violate the Fifth Amendment. The Andresen Court maintains
that the foundation for the decision in Couch was the absence of com-
pulsion against the accused. 8 Thus, the Andresen Court suggests that
the holding in Couch was based upon the recognition " . . . that the
protection afforded by the . . .Fifth Amendment 'adheres basically to
the person, not to information which may incriminate him.' " How-
ever, this represents an incorrect reading of Couch which, in fact, stands
for the proposition that papers that are no longer private may be subpoe-
naed and introduced into evidence at trial. By voluntarily transferring
possession of her private papers to her accountant, the defendant gave
up her expectation of privacy.70 The papers lost the protection of the
Fifth Amendment not because the privilege attaches to the party only,
but rather because the papers were no longer private.7' Couch says noth-
ing to defeat the idea that the Fifth Amendment protects against the
compelled production of private papers.7"
Finally, Andresen cites Marron v. United States" and Abel v. United
States,"4 cases in which papers which arguably were private were seized
and introduced into evidence over Fifth Amendment objections. How-
ever, this fact does not necessarily detract from the idea that the privi-
lege is concerned with the private nature of the papers seized; in addi-
tion to the requirement that a paper be private, the Supreme Court has
held that it must be testimonial and used in a testimonial manner.7"
capacity, the privilege would be applicable. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-
90 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1944); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
67. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
68. 427 U.S. at 472-73.
69. Id. at 473, quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
70. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973).
71. Thus, in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), when the accused communi-
cated with the government informant, he lost his Fifth Amendment protection because
he gave up his reasonable expectation of privacy by making the communication to the
informant, rather than because the communication was not compelled.
72. See also Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), and Johnson v. United States,
228 U.S. 457 (1913). In these cases, as in Couch, materials requested by subpoena were
held to be not privileged because they had been transferred from the defendant to a third
party.
73. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
74. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
75. See note 30 supra. Thus, in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), the
business ledger was allowed into evidence over Fourth and Fifth Amendment objections,
not because it was legally seized, but rather because it was offered as part of the
"equipment ... used to commit the offense," id. at 199, and not as testimonial evidence.
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Items of evidence may be private in nature, their production may be
compelled, and their introduction may be incriminating, but absent a
characterization as "testimonial," they are not protected from produc-
tion by the Fifth Amendment.7 6 The holdings in both Marron and Abel
were based upon the non-testimonial nature of the evidence at issue;"
they do not represent a retreat from the historic concern for privacy."
IMPACT
The impact of the Andresen decision in the area of criminal procedure
may well be substantial. Although the Court was only confronted with
a situation involving a seizure of private business records pursuant to a
search warrant, the broad scope of its reasoning leaves room for its
applicability to other factual patterns. By emphasizing form over sub-
stance in its reasoning, the Court has impliedly stated that any item of
evidence may be properly seized and introduced into evidence at trial.
All that is required is that the search be legal and that there be no
"forced" testimonial communication during the various stages of the
search, seizure, and subsequent introduction of the item into evidence
at trial. The nature of the item will receive no attention in the Court's
analysis. Thus, it would appear that the most intimate of items, a diary,
for example, can now be the subject of a reasonable search and seizure
as long as the technical requirements of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments are met. After Andresen, it would appear that only private items
which have been subpoenaed would remain within the protective scope
of the Fifth Amendment.79 Yet, even this is not absolutely certain.80
The end result of Andresen is not simply that private papers are no
longer protected from seizure by the privilege, but, additionally, that
the extent to which privacy is protected by the Fifth Amendment has
been restricted solely to the words of the individual. The privilege still
protects one from making or producing incriminating statements under
Likewise, in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), the papers and evidence of
espionage were admitted because they were offered as either corroborative evidence or "as
useful means for one engaged in espionage." Id. at 220.
76. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 490 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. This is because of the implied oral communication present when one produces in
response to a subpoena, not because of any sanctity involved in the nature of the items
requested. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
80. In Andresen, the Court states only that "[tihe Fifth Amendment may protect an
individual from complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in
his possession." 427 U.S. at 473-74.
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duress. However, the zone of privacy, that private "inner sanctum of
thought and feeling," which has been wistfully referred to in a number
of the Court's opinions,"' has been eliminated from the scope of the Fifth
Amendment.
Harry Lee
81. Perhaps the strongest statement of the scope of the Fifth Amendment's protection
of privacy was made by Justice Douglas in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). He stated:
Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what he
believes, what he thinks, what he possesses. . . . Those who wrote the Bill of
Rights believed that every individual needs both to communicate with others
and to keep his affairs to himself. That dual aspect of privacy means that the
individual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and circum-
stances when he will share his secrets with others and decide the extent of that
sharing.
